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1. Summary  
Donors became interested in government accountability after the release of the World 
Development Report in 2004.  Subsequently, the World Bank and international donors supported 
interventions that were designed to increase transparency which in turn was expected to promote 
accountability in developing countries.  The limited evidence from impact assessments of such 
interventions steered by Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) indicates that there is more impact in 
Rwanda than other African states. This trend occurs because of the stronger government 
institutions and commitment to development in Rwanda (Wild et al., 2015; Honeyman, 2017).  
However, Rwandan CSOs operate with constraints on their freedom of expression, therefore 
criticism of the government is muted (Francois, 2017).   
This rapid literature review is based on sources from academic and grey literature.  It comprises 
of audits of civil society in Rwanda undertaken by international CSOs such as Civicus and 
Transparency International and assessments of accountability programmes using randomised 
control designs or case studies.  The audits are based on surveys, in-depth interviews or focus 
groups with members of the public who are asked to rate the effectiveness of CSOs in providing 
information or advocating on behalf of citizens.  The literature on impact assessments of social 
accountability programmes is sparse (Joshi, 2013; Fox, 2015) and there are very few studies on 
Rwanda.  This review was able to find two assessments of civil society and three case study 
assessments of social accountability programmes in Rwanda.  The literature on social 
accountability or transparency and accountability initiatives does not highlight issues pertaining to 
the role of donors in accountability programmes.   
Recent scholarship on social accountability notes that the theory of change which assumes that 
transparency leads to accountability relies on the premise that citizens, including marginalised 
groups, have agency to effect change.  However, this premise is overly optimistic in most 
developing countries (Fox, 2015).  Consequently, there is a push for adapting programmes to 
suit local conditions (Wild et al., 2015), and for the ‘sandwich strategy’ which requires that 
multiple coalitions advocate for accountability (Fox, 2015).  Furthermore, CSOs play a useful role 
as intermediaries which purvey information in user-friendly formats and advocate for 
accountability on behalf of the community (van Zyl, 2014).   
The main findings on the impact of social accountability programmes in several developing 
countries are as follows (Joshi, 2013; Fox, 2015):   
• The evidence on the impact of social accountability interventions is mixed; 
• Public expenditure tracking surveys, citizen report cards and community score cards 
have resulted in improved performance outcomes in some cases; 
• Interventions have been more successful in reducing corruption than enhancing service 
delivery; and  
• Voice and accountability interventions which are targeted directly at women and other 
marginalised groups have yielded some impact on empowerment (Joshi, 2013).  For 
example, in Bangladesh the parents of girls in schools mobilised to monitor teacher 
attendance and discourage absenteeism. 
In Rwanda, the key findings from impact assessments of accountability programmes are as 
follows:   
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• The impact of civil society on accountability is perceived as moderate by citizens 
(Civicus, 2011); 
• Over 70% of citizens state that CSOs influence public policy and 66% assert that CSOs 
engage with the state (Transparency International Rwanda, 2015); 
• An evaluation of the CARE Community Score Card (CSC) found that it had a positive 
impact on service delivery.  Feedback from the CSC was communicated to local 
government by service providers, leading to tangible improvements in service delivery 
such as mobile clinics and more health workers (Wild et al., 2015); 
• The Rwanda Threshold Programme which aimed to promote civic participation did not 
have a positive impact on accountability; 
• The Rwandan government has utilised performance contracts, referred to as imihigo, to 
raise service standards in the public sector.  In the education sector imihigo has limited 
impact on the quality of education although there is a positive impact on school 
infrastructure.  Bottom-up initiatives are less effective (Honeyman, 2015); and  
• CSOs are aid dependent and 75% rely on international aid (Transparency International 
Rwanda, 2015).   
2. Background 
Donor interest in strengthening accountability was stimulated after the publication of the World 
Development Report (WDR) of 2004 (Wild, Wales, & Chambers, 2015).  The WDR was built on 
the principal-agent approach in which citizens are the principles and elected officials are the 
agents.  It assumes that principles are able to hold agents accountable (Fox, 2015).  
Accountability is defined as the obligation of those who hold power to take responsibility for their 
actions through explanation or justification (McNeil & Male, 2010).  The accountability of state 
actors is derived from the social compact between citizens and their elected representatives in a 
democratic setting (McNeil & Male, 2010).  The WDR contends that the ‘long route’ of 
accountability through elected representatives failed the poor and argues instead for 
strengthening the ‘short route’ of direct accountability between users and service providers 
(Joshi, 2013, p. 530).  Subsequently, policymakers have devoted much attention to examining 
alternatives for strengthening the ‘short route’.   
According to Joshi (2013) the interest in transparency and accountability comes from two distinct 
ideological streams.  New Public Management (NPM), which emerged in the 1990s, 
encourages the adoption of market mechanisms in the public sector in order to make providers 
more responsive and accountable. NPM reforms for accountability concentrate on vertical 
accountability within organisations through mechanisms such as performance-based pay, citizen 
charters, and complaint hotlines.  Furthermore, NPM approaches regard citizens as individual 
consumers who should have a choice of providers in order for markets to deliver accountability.  
At the same time proponents of rights-based approaches argued that governments have an 
obligation to provide basic services which were ‘rights’ that should be protected by the 
constitution or legislation (Joshi, 2013, p. 531).  For example, McNeil & Male (2010) declare that 
citizens have both the right and the responsibility to demand accountability from the government.  
Consequently they state: “citizens have the right to ensure that public actors (a) obey the law and 
not abuse their powers, and (b) serve the public interest in an efficient, effective, and fair 
manner” (McNeil & Male, 2010, p. 5).  The literature on transparency accountability initiatives, 
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feedback mechanisms and social accountability relates to interventions which are designed to 
promote the ‘short route’ (Jump, 2013; Wild et al., 2015).   
In sub-Saharan Africa, transparency regarding public revenue is extremely weak due to 
corruption.  Moreover, a large portion of government revenue comes from international aid and 
the export of primary resources rather than tax revenue, which further diminishes the sense of 
accountability among citizens with regard to public revenue (McNeil & Male, 2010).  
Governments, civil society, and donors have become increasingly interested in the idea that 
citizens can contribute to improved quality of service delivery by holding policy makers and 
providers of services accountable (Ringold, Holla, Koziol, & Srinivasan, 2011).  Civil society 
organisations (CSOs) can play an important role in bridging the gap between transparency and 
accountability by functioning as information intermediaries, as well as by putting pressure on 
oversight institutions (van Zyl, 2014).   
After the 1994 genocide there was an influx of CSOs in Rwanda, including international non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) (Civicus, 2011).  Transparency International Rwanda (2015, 
p. 2) states that “CSOs can be described as all organised activity not associated with major 
institutional systems: government and administration, education and health delivery, business 
and industry, security and organised religion.”  CSOs have been instrumental in the 
peacebuilding and post-conflict transformation processes (Francois, 2017).  Moreover, CSOs are 
a third sector, which is mainly involved in service delivery and religious activity.  Very few CSOs 
engage in policy advocacy or oversight of the government, thus voice and accountability are 
lagging behind compared to other areas in Rwandan social and economic life (Transparency 
International Rwanda, 2015, p. 4).  Although the government of Rwanda regards CSOs as a 
pillar of good governance, there are restrictions on political activities and advocacy.  In addition, 
the government has been accused of hindering human rights groups and limiting dissent 
(Nichols-Barrer, Protik, Berman, & Sloan, 2015).  This report reviews the literature on social 
accountability and examines the impact of CSOs and community participation in Rwanda in 
terms of promoting transparency and accountability.  Donor support for the Rwandan 
government and CSOs is briefly reviewed.   
 
3. Social accountability 
The literature on social accountability is parsimonious and thus far has not considered any in-
depth case studies in Rwanda. However, this literature is briefly reviewed as it offers insights 
regarding the design of interventions to improve accountability used in other developing 
countries.  Social accountability is a process whereby citizens hold the state accountable 
(McNeil & Male, 2010).  Citizen- or civil society-led initiatives to hold the government accountable 
include public demonstrations, protests, advocacy and lobbying.  However, accountability can 
also be achieved using participatory data collection and analytical tools.  This emphasis on data 
has led to a growth of social accountability practices which utilise a solid evidence base as well 
as dialogue and negotiation with the government, such as participatory public policy-making, 
participatory budgeting, public expenditure tracking, as well as citizen monitoring and evaluation 
of public services.  McNeil & Male (2010) identify the following spheres for social accountability:   
• Public budgets – this includes budget literacy, analysis of the implications of budget 
allocations, and advocacy for greater public influence on national budget decisions;  
5 
• Public expenditure – this includes public expenditure tracking exercises, for example the 
education expenditure tracking surveys in Malawi; and  
• Public service delivery – citizen participation in monitoring and evaluating service delivery 
to assess the accessibility and quality of public goods and services. For example, in 
Malawi there are service delivery satisfaction surveys and community score cards which 
allow users and service providers to evaluate the quality of public services. In Kenya, 
citizen report cards and roadshows are used to strengthen community participation in the 
provision of water and sanitation.1   
In the transparency-accountability framework, providing information about public services 
(including the services which citizens are entitled to, how to access them and the quality of 
services) encourages citizens to demand accountability leading to improved service delivery 
(Ringold et al., 2011).  The theory of change is built on the premise that providing information 
improves accountability by motivating localised collective action (Fox, 2015).  However, this 
theory of change makes several assumptions which are listed below (Ringold et al., 2011; Joshi, 
2013; Fox, 2015):   
• Citizens  have the ability and incentive to access and process information about service 
delivery; 
• Citizens are principles regardless of whether or not they live under electorally competitive 
regimes; 
• Citizens have homogenous interests and goals; 
• Service users are willing and able to use information to put pressure on service 
providers; 
• Policy makers and service providers are responsive; 
• Failures in service delivery are due to poor motivation among public officials rather than 
the lack of resources or capacity; 
• There is a credible threat of sanctions for poor service; and 
• The demand for accountability will trigger the supply of accountability through market 
mechanisms.     
Recent literature on social accountability is sceptical of the aforementioned assumptions, which 
are regarded as unrealistic given the conditions in many developing countries (Fox, 2015; Joshi, 
2013). There is a lack of clarity with regard to the expected impacts: “This confusion arises partly 
because studies of impact rarely examine the impact of accountability and transparency alone, 
looking instead at the impact of a range of governance interventions, such as changing 
incentives for public officials or improved management processes.” (Joshi, 2013, p. 540).  Fox 
(2015, p. 349) suggests that a more nuanced approach to social accountability, which addresses 
the following issues, is required: 
• The kind of information that can empower the poor; 
• Information needs to be perceived as actionable, this means that citizens must be able to 
act on the information, 
                                                   
1 These initiatives were undertaken by CSOs or service providers.   
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• An enabling environment which reduces the fear of reprisal is necessary to encourage 
citizen led action; 
• Decentralisation which brings government closer to the people; 
• Community participation, which is likely to represent socially excluded groups; and 
• Community oversight mechanisms which can address state failure. 
 
The evidence on the impact of accountability and transparency initiatives comes from case 
studies, randomised controlled trials, quantitative/qualitative evaluations, and participatory 
evaluations (Joshi, 2013).  Fox (2015) and Joshi (2013) reviewed several impact assessments 
conducted in Africa and Asia and found that the impact of social accountability initiatives is 
varied.2  Since the evidence from Rwanda is limited, evidence of impact from other African and 
Asian countries is summarised as follows:   
• There is no clear indication as to whether ‘top-down’ initiatives are better than ‘bottom-up’ 
initiatives; 
• The performance of information dissemination accountability initiatives is varied. For 
example, studies in Bangladesh and Uganda found that information dissemination led to 
reduced absenteeism among teachers or health workers in schools and health clinics, 
respectively. In contrast, similar initiatives had little impact on education outcomes in 
India; 
• Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) used by CSOs in Uganda, Malawi and 
Tanzania resulted in positive impact, such as reduced corruption or improved 
remuneration in the health and education sectors; 
• Complaint mechanisms and charters work better in urban than rural areas; 
• Citizen report cards were pioneered by a CSO in Bangalore, India where they had 
considerable impact on improving public services.  However, in Bangalore there was 
assistance from an active, independent media and CSOs that were willing to advocate for 
accountability and reforms; 
• Community monitoring had a positive impact on health and education services in Uganda 
and Kenya, however the impact was modest in Indonesia; 
• Social audits and public hearings initiated by grassroots CSOs were effective in terms of 
reducing corruption in India; and  
• Community score cards (CSCs) were associated with improved user satisfaction levels in 
India and Madagascar. 
Joshi (2013) finds that transparency accountability initiatives are effective in terms of exposing 
corruption, but the results are more mixed with regard to the impact on the accessibility and 
quality of public services. Moreover, social accountability mechanisms are more likely to have 
traction if they are supported by formal sanctions or willingness from the public sector to 
support attempts that improve accountability.  In addition, collective accountability mechanisms 
may be better suited for increasing voices of poor and vulnerable citizens, since they may have 
greater impact than individual action (Joshi, 2013).  Context is very important, as accountability 
strategies may require adaptation to local conditions (Fox, 2015).  For example, an evaluation of 
                                                   
2 There were no case studies on Rwanda in the literature reviewed by Fox (2015) or Joshi (2013).   
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the CARE CSC across four African countries revealed that stronger institutions and the 
developmental state model in Rwanda fostered a stronger commitment to improve local service 
delivery (Wild et al., 2015, p. 33).   
Fox (2015, p. 352) discusses a strategic approach to accountability, with a theory of change 
which specifies multiple links in a causal chain. This strategic approach encompasses the 
following elements:   
• An emphasis on user centred and actionable information. This requires the identification 
of information which, if disclosed, will change the perceptions of citizens and encourage 
them to engage in collective action; 
• The scaling up of a voice which can be achieved with information and communication 
technology or through the use of interlocutors which act as facilitators of two-way 
communication; 
• An enabling environment which reduces the risk of challenging the state. This may be 
achieved through the use of external allies; 
• Improvements in state capacity which encourages responsiveness; and 
• Strengthening vertical accountability so that politicians and bureaucrats are more 
accountable to citizens.    
Fox (2015) recommends a ‘sandwich strategy’ which involves coalitions of pro-accountability 
forces that bridge the state-society divide and break the ’low accountability’ traps.  A four-country 
evaluation of the CARE CSCs provided empirical support for the accountability sandwich 
strategy (Wild et al., 2015). The findings emphasise the importance of framing a score card in 
terms of building collaboration and collective interests. Moreover, CSCs can help to change 
working practices if the information they gather is channelled to higher levels of local 
government, although this requires that states have the political will to support reforms (Wild et 
al., 2015). In such states, the feedback from CSCs can improve access to services.   
 
4. CSOs and accountability in Rwanda  
Although governments have a duty to be transparent even countries with high levels of 
transparency produce public information in formats which are not user-friendly or accessible (van 
Zyk, 2014).  CSOs play an important role by interpreting and disseminating such information in 
formats which are easy to understand.  Van Zyl (2014, p. 248) mentions four ways in which 
CSOs can facilitate the transition from transparency to accountability:   
• Accessing, interpreting and distributing information to multiple stakeholders in a usable 
format; 
• Demanding accountability from government directly; 
• Supporting and encouraging formal oversight actors (such as legislators, auditors and 
judges) to demand accountability; and  
• Supporting other stakeholders (such as political parties, activists and donors) to demand 
accountability.   
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Effectiveness of CSOs 
The effectiveness of civil society or citizens in promoting accountability is assessed using score 
cards, report cards and audits (Ringold et al., 2011).  Surveys and focus groups with members of 
CSOs, the public or stakeholders are conducted to generate data which is one of the sources of 
information used in score cards or audits.  Civicus conducted an evaluation of CSOs in Rwanda 
which combined in-depth interviews and a survey among key stakeholders.  The study found that 
CSOs in Rwanda attained an overall impact rating of 1.9 on a scale from zero to three, which 
was moderate (Civicus, 2011, p. 37).  Figure 1 depicts the ratings for the sub-categories of the 
overall rating.   
Figure 1:  Impact Scores for CSOs 
 
Source: Civicus, 2011, p. 38 
Interviews with the leaders of local CSOs found that only 50% believed that they are able to 
influence the decisions of local authorities (Civicus, 2011).  In addition, 57% of respondents from 
regional stakeholder consultations believed that CSOs were very or quite active in holding the 
state accountable and 16% stated that CSOs were very or quite effective in terms of holding 
private corporations accountable.  The state was not challenged by civil society and the majority 
of the stakeholders believed that political will rather than advocacy is responsible for 
accountability (Civicus, 2011).  The report also found that overall there were higher levels of trust 
in the president and the armed forces than in CSOs.  Similarly, Francois (2017, p. 17) states that 
the level of trust in CSOs involved in national reconciliation is 51% and it was perceived that 36% 




Table 1:  Effectiveness of Civil Society -1  
 
Source:  Transparency International Rwanda, 2015, p. 64 
Transparency International Rwanda undertook a survey of citizens’ perceptions of CSOs in 2015.  
A comparison of the 2015 results with the findings of an earlier 2012 survey is provided in Table 
1.  Overall, over 70% of the respondents believe that civil society is able to influence public policy 
(Transparency International Rwanda, 2015, p. 62).   Two thirds (66%) stated that civil society 
was able to engage with the state and 62% stated that they engaged with the private sector. 
However, this was a vast improvement on 2012 figures. 
Table 2:  Effectiveness of Civil Society -2 
 
 Source:  Transparency International Rwanda, 2015, p. 65 
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Table 2 indicates that CSOs are more effective in terms of building capacity for collective action, 
empowering vulnerable people (74%) and empowering women (73%).  CSOs are also very 
effective in terms of lobbying for state services, poverty eradication and environmental 
sustainability.  Less than two in three CSOs (66%) are responsive to social interests. However, 
only one in four and meet the needs of vulnerable people (Transparency International Rwanda, 
2015, p. 65).   
 
Case studies  
CARE Community Score Card  
CARE International implemented a CSC programme in Rwanda and three other African 
countries.  In Rwanda the CSC was implemented in partnership with a well-established service 
delivery programme, the Public Policy Information, Monitoring and Advocacy Project 
(PPIMA).  Several mechanisms were introduced by the government to enable citizens to 
participate in local development planning processes which include imihigo, ubundehe, umuganda 
and district open days (Wild et al., 2015).3  However, these approaches reflect a ‘top-down’ 
centrally driven policy which is driven by the state. CSO’s including CARE International provide 
‘bottom-up’ accountability mechanisms to complement the government initiatives. The ‘bottom-
up’ initiatives provide a forum for Rwandan citizens to openly challenge the effectiveness of 
district authorities.  CARE’s CSC was adapted across local contexts and communities were able 
to decide which sectors the CSC would focus on.  The CSC programme provided a forum for 
service providers to explain the challenges they face to citizens, as well as their superiors (Wild 
et al., 2015).  
In Rwanda, there were many examples where service providers reported concerns raised by 
service users to the district authorities and this led to a redistribution of resources in some cases 
(Wild et al., 2015).  There was improvement in the relationship between service users, service 
providers and the local authorities.  As such, the ‘culture of silence’ was challenged.  The 
feedback led to alterations in staff schedules and the creation of mobile HIV and reproductive 
health services.  More nurses were hired and there were improvements to infrastructure such as 
water pipelines, health centres, roads and nurseries (Wild et al., 2015).  Data from focus groups 
revealed that before the programme local authorities perceive the citizens to be ignorant but that 
as a result of the CSC the credibility of the community was enhanced.  In addition, service 
providers claimed that citizens were more understanding of the difficulties which the providers 
faced and less inclined to blame the providers for problems (Wild et al., 2015). 
Wild et al. (2015) notes that Rwanda is the only country where there is a clear example that 
information generated by the CSC was channelled to the national government and contributed 
policy dialogue.  Findings from the CSC provided an input into the district dialogue processes 
which aided the wider CSO accountability processes.  Consequently, the information was then 
passed on to several ministries and contributed to a government decision to review health 
                                                   
3 Rwanda has developed home grown initiatives which build on traditional concepts of participation so that the 
developmental state is inclusive and ‘home grown’ (Hasselskog, 2018). In Kinyarwanda imihigo means taking a 
vow to deliver something or a pledge, ubundehe refers to pre-colonial practices of mutual support and collective 
action to solve problems and umuganda refers to voluntary work (Hasselskog, 2018).   
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insurance targets.  Wild et al. (2015) attribute this feedback loop to the strength of public sector 
institutions in Rwanda. 
Rwanda Threshold Programme 
The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) sponsored the Rwanda Threshold Programme 
(RTP), a programme designed to enhance the contribution of local and national CSOs in 
government policymaking (Nichols-Barrer et al., 2015).  The strengthening civic participation 
component of the programme occurred from June 2009 to December 2011 and was 
implemented in conjunction with USAID and government stakeholders.  The programme entailed:  
training local government officials with regard to mechanisms to increase civic participation; 
technical assistance to build the management and advocacy components of local CSOs, grants 
to local government and CSOs and training for government departments so that they could 
develop and distribute a citizens’ guide to the national budget (Nichols-Barrer et al., 2015).   
The rollout of the programme was conducted in two phases so that the 30 districts in Rwanda 
could be randomly allocated to either phase I or phase II.  A baseline survey (9,619 respondents) 
was administered in both treatment and control districts before the start of the programme and a 
follow-up survey (10,032 respondents) was conducted in 2012 after the programme activities 
ended (Nichols-Barrer et al., 2015).  In addition, in-depth interviews were conducted with 
government officials and CSOs.  Regression analysis was used to examine the impact of the 
programme. Several of the RTP’s expected outcomes were not achieved especially in terms 
citizens’ perceptions of communication between CSOs and the government.  One explanation for 
this failure may be that the programme was designed to build the capacity of CSO’s and local 
government officials, therefore even if the amount of communication between CSOs and 
government officials increased this would not be reflected in the perceptions of the citizens. It is 
also possible that in the longer term there may be a detectable positive impact.  The qualitative 
research revealed that CSOs reported that citizens were encouraged to voice dissatisfaction 
more openly as a result of the RTP (Nichols-Barrer et al., 2015).  
Imihigo in the education sector 
The understanding of accountability in Rwanda is influenced by English, French and most 
importantly the official language Kinyarwanda.  In Rwanda, accountability is synonymous with the 
act of making pledges and fulfilling them, known as guhiga no guhigura in Kinyarwanda 
(Honeyman, 2017).  The terms guhiga or imihigo were historically used in Rwanda to refer to 
public pledges or acts of bravery (Honeyman, 2017).  The contemporary imihigo system of 
performance management contracts originated as a public pledge in the form of a written 
contract which specifies development targets and performance indicators. Imihigo has become a 
crucial tool of governance at national, provincial, district, sector, sell and village levels 
(Honeyman, 2017).  Moreover, imihigo plays an important role in decentralisation. From 2006 to 
2009, district imihigo were used to compare performance and achievements and district mayors 
were either praised or censured according to their performance. For example, in 2015 mayors in 
four districts resigned because of unsatisfactory performance evaluations (Honeyman, 2017). 
However, the education component of the district imihigo reveals that objectives are often set 
with little knowledge of the national education sector strategy. In addition, the system places 
priority on objectives which are easily quantified and measured even though some of the most 
important goals for education quality are not easily quantifiable (Honeyman, 2017, p. 8).   
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Honeyman (2017) identifies the following problems with the imihigo system for the education 
sector:  
• The greatest focus was on the construction of physical infrastructure because this is 
visible and attracts public attention. As Honeyman (2017, p. 9) states: “If a district action 
plan objective such as increasing parents’ participation in school meetings is not attained, 
it is unlikely that many people will know; however, if a district imihigo objective such as 
building a certain number of primary classrooms is not attained, it is likely that the district 
mayor may be publicly shamed and called to account for the failure”; 
• The imihigo system creates negative incentives.  For example, there are many instances 
where students who could not pay school lunch fees were dismissed from school so that 
officials could achieve the imihigo target of 100% contribution to the school feeding 
programme; 
• The Rwandan constitution of 2003 guarantees the right to education while several pieces 
of legislation and ministerial orders facilitate a system of top-down accountability within 
the education system. However, there is no available evidence for assessing the extent 
to which the objective of universal access to education has been achieved; 
• There is a hierarchical system of supervision which ends with the Ministry of Local 
Government which has no education specialists and no direct reporting line to the 
Ministry of Education. Furthermore, education is not a priority for local governments 
therefore this reporting structure creates fewer incentives for boosting education quality.   
 
‘Bottom-up’ accountability in the education system appears to lag behind the ‘top-down’ 
accountability provided by the imihigo system.  The General Assembly Committee which 
comprises the headmaster, two parent representatives, two teacher representatives and two 
student representatives is the mechanism for ‘bottom-up’ accountability (Honeyman, 2017). The 
General Assembly Committee is intended to ensure public oversight of school management and 
education quality at the local level. However, Honeyman (2017) notes that parental engagement 
is low, and elected representatives are not very informed about management and performance 
issues and tend to avoid conflict with the headmaster.  Another ‘bottom-up’ mechanism, national 
examination results, are published at the aggregate level by the media and there is little 
assessment or comparison of these results at local level or across time.  Therefore, public 
information about education quality in Rwanda is limited (Honeyman, 2017, p. 15).  
 
There are a number of formal and informal structures at the village or umudugudu level to 
discuss local issues or complaints and while education issues are often raised they are generally 
not a high priority concern.  From 2012 onwards, the Rwanda Governance Board conducted an 
annual citizen report card study using questionnaires, interviews and focus group discussions to 
assess public opinion with regard to government service provision, including education.  This 
initiative provides public opinion data with regard to the quality of education, provision of school 
lunches, physical infrastructure and accessibility of schools in terms of distance. However, the 
data is underutilised as an information resource for accountability (Honeyman, 2017). In addition, 
several CSOs collaborate in the PPIMA which implements a CSC.  Education has been identified 
as an area of public concern through the community score card (Honeyman, 2017).  
Transparency International Rwanda also conducted a CSC in conjunction with the public 
expenditure tracking surveys which encompasses education.  Although there are multiple 
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mechanisms for the public to hold the government to account, there are few opportunities to 
criticise the leadership (Honeyman, 2017). 
 
5. Donor support in Rwanda 
The Rwandan government’s reputation for being largely corruption free has resulted in the 
receipt of a large amount of foreign aid disbursed in the form of budget support (Swedlund, 
2013).  The government of Rwanda has a clear preference for budget support compared with 
other aid modalities.  Rwanda is a highly aid dependent country and in 2015 30-40% of its 
national budget was derived from aid (Hasselskog et al., 2017, p. 1819).  Most budget support 
has been provided by the UK, the European Commission, the World Bank and the African 
Development Bank.  There are also bilateral relationships with Germany, Belgium and the 
Netherlands (Swedlund, 2013).  Despite high levels of aid, the RPF government has been able to 
exercise much agency in its relationship with donors (Curtis, 2015).   
The Rwandan government and donors established a mutual accountability framework 
(Versailles, 2012). The Common Performance Assessment Framework (CPAF) is a matrix of 45 
indicators based on Rwanda’s poverty reduction strategy.  The CPAF permits development 
partners to hold the government accountable for delivering economic development and poverty 
reduction (Versailles, 2012).  The CPAF arose in response to the needs of budget support 
donors for a monitoring and accountability framework.  The Donor Performance Assessment 
Framework (DPAF) was developed to align indicators with the Vision 2020 strategy of the 
government.  The development partners have committed to helping the government achieve the 
DPAF targets, thus creating a framework for mutual accountability (Versailles, 2012).  
Donors such as UNICEF, UNESCO, DFID and USAID are involved in horizontal accountability as 
they are co-chairs in the Technical Working Groups (TWGs) (Honeyman, 2017).  In the 
education sector the TWGs influence policy and strategy in relation to planning and 
management, curriculum and assessment, teacher professional development and early 
childhood development (Honeyman, 2017).  
There is very little literature on the donor support for civil society in Rwanda. CSOs in Rwanda 
are dependent on financial and technical support from international stakeholders and 74% of 
CSOs have international partners (Transparency International Rwanda, 2015, p. 72).  Three 
quarters (75%) of CSOs are dependent on donors for funding. however only 36% state that 
financial resources are sufficient for accomplishing their goals (Transparency International 
Rwanda, 2015, p. 73).  The Civicus evaluation of CSOs highlighted the need for Rwandan CSOs 
to become less dependent on donor funding so that they can exercise more independence in 
carrying out their missions (Civicus, 2011, p. 44).   
A mapping study conducted for the European Union found that a relatively small group of donors 
support CSOs in Rwanda:  USAID, DFID, SIDA, German Co-operation, Swiss Co-operation, 
Belgian Technical Co-operation, the World Bank and UNDP (Constantini, Verdecchia, & 
Rutayisire, 2013, p. 48).  Other key findings from Constantini et al. (2013, p. 49) are listed below: 
• USAID funds Rwandan CSOs only, 
• Belgian Technical Co-operation funds international NGOs in partnership with local 
CSOs; 
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• The World Bank funds local CSOs in partnership with public authorities; 
• Rwanda is the beneficiary of the World Bank’s Global Partnership for Social 
Accountability; 
• DFID and SIDA work together to support capacity building for local CSOs; 
• USAID funds public participation in the decentralisation process and to improve service 
delivery; and  
• DFID funds the PPIMA.   
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